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This essay looks at two aspects of the virtual ‘material world’ of realist 
fiction: objects encountered by the protagonist and the latter’s body. Taking 
from Sartre two angles on the realist pact by which readers agree to lend 
their bodies, feelings, and experiences to the otherwise ‘languishing signs’ 
of the text, it goes on to examine two sets of first-person fictions published 
between 1902 and 1956 — first, four modernist texts in which banal objects 
defy and then gratify the protagonist, who ends up ready and almost able 
to write; and, second, three novels in which the body of the protagonist is 
indeterminate in its sex, gender, or sexuality. In each of these cases, how do 
we as readers make texts work for us as ‘an adventure of the body’?
keywords objects, the body, Proust, Rilke, Hofmannsthal, Sartre, Gide
‘Aussi loin que ma mémoire remonte en arrière’, wrote Gide in a rather different 
connection, ‘il est là’ (Gide, 1954: 349). I find this is true of realism in its relation to 
my own research. It is there however far forward I come as well. My next two papers 
will be on dogs in three authors and two films, in relation to the eloquence of 
the mute body, and on how we judge Camus’s Meursault and Lionel Shriver’s Eva 
Katchadourian innocent or guilty in relation to their use of first- and second-person 
narrative. Both these multiply comparative projects centre on the question of how a 
sense of material reality is represented in a verbal artefact that makes certain demands 
on readers to believe or not believe, assent or not assent. This would be my working 
definition of realism. In this essay I will trace this question through research I have 
published since 1981: how do fictions, in the first or third person, intrinsically silent 
and unbodied, make those demands on the bodied reader in the name of dead authors 
and undead characters?
This is what Sartre wrote in 1947 on the subject of bodies and books:
l’objet littéraire n’a d’autre substance que la subjectivité du lecteur: l’attente de Raskoln-
ikoff, c’est mon attente, que je lui prête; sans cette impatience du lecteur il ne demeurerait 
que des signes languissants; sa haine contre le juge d’instruction qui l’interroge, c’est ma 
haine, sollicitée, captée par les signes, et le juge d’instruction lui-même, il n’existerait pas 
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sans la haine que je lui porte à travers Raskolnikoff; c’est elle qui l’anime, elle est sa chair. 
[. . .] par un renversement qui est le propre de l’objet imaginaire, ce ne sont pas ses 
conduites qui provoquent mon indignation ou mon estime, mais mon indignation, mon 
estime qui donnent de la consistance et de l’objectivité à ses conduites. (Sartre, 1948: 95 
and 100)
Reading, in this schema, is a ‘pacte de générosité entre l’auteur et le lecteur’ (Sartre, 
1948: 105), based on the ‘don de toute sa personne, avec ses passions, ses préventions, 
ses sympathies, son tempérament sexuel, son échelle de valeurs’ (Sartre, 1948: 100). 
Two bodies, almost certainly absent to each other in time and space but not unaware 
of each other’s crucial virtual existence, collude to produce a third body, the person 
in the text.
Half a generation later, he describes the books in his grandfather’s study:
Je ne savais pas encore lire que, déjà, je les révérais, ces pierres levées: droites ou penchées, 
serrées comme des briques sur les rayons de la bibliothèque ou noblement espacées en 
allées de menhirs, je sentais que la prospérité de notre famille en dépendait. [. . .] mon 
grand-père — si maladroit, d’habitude, que ma mère lui boutonnait les gants — maniait 
ces objets culturels avec une dextérité d’officiant. [. . .] Quelquefois je m’approchais pour 
observer ces boîtes qui se fendaient comme des huîtres et je découvrais la nudité de leurs 
organes intérieurs, des feuilles blêmes et moisies, légèrement boursouflées, couvertes de 
veinules noires, qui buvaient l’encre et sentaient le champignon. (Sartre, 1964: 37)
Here the body re-enters the text, securely ironized by the sixty-year-old autobiogra-
pher (whose lifelong aversion to oysters and mushrooms is well documented), as the 
affect invested in books by a child whose animism depends on his analphabetism. 
Because he cannot read, he reads the patriarch’s books as the solid stones on which 
family fortunes depend, the sacred objects of a writer’s graceful mastery. Yet when 
the child approaches them, they break open with a shock, in a primal scene of the 
discovery of the uncanny — the gate to the mother’s inner body. 
Both these images are essential for understanding realism. From the point of 
view of sweet reason, I find Sartre’s first representation of the process of reading 
admirable; but we also need the second representation in order to incorporate what 
is at stake when we draw near to the body in the library. Affect, fantasy, horror, and 
seduction attend every act of reading, all the more if we accept that to ‘be inside’ (or 
to ‘have entered’) a thing of language is like being inside (or entering) a body. In 1853 
Flaubert contrasted the travail of writing two very different books: ‘Saint Antoine ne 
m’a pas demandé le quart de la tension d’esprit que la Bovary me cause. C’était un 
déversoir; je n’ai eu que plaisir à écrire, et les dix-huit mois que j’ai passés à en écrire 
les 500 pages ont été les plus profondément voluptueux de toute ma vie. Juge donc, 
il faut que j’entre à toute minute dans des peaux qui me sont antipathiques’ (Flaubert, 
1980b: 297). Man and boy, writer and reader, here both treat the text as a woman 
they hesitate to enter. Any approach to a text is a fantasmatic adventure of the 
body.
I will look presently at three cases of texts whose authors deliberately cultivate inde-
terminacy in the bodies of their protagonists, testing their readability to the utmost. 
But I shall begin with my first substantial piece of research, published in 1981.
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In a letter to Louise Colet of 1846, Flaubert wrote: ‘Il y a [. . .] dans chaque 
objet banal de merveilleuses histoires. Chaque pavé de la rue a peut-être son sublime’ 
(Flaubert, 1980a: 307). In the late 1970s, when I completed my PhD thesis and adapte d 
it into The Banal Object (1981), I was interested in how objects exist and have effects 
in prose fiction. I was comparing four texts, two in French and two in German, 
published in the first half of the twentieth century and which are different in many 
ways, not least in length — Proust and Hofmannsthal weighing in at very different 
ends of the scale — but which had in common the semi-autobiographical treatment 
of a negative apprenticeship in becoming an author.1 The texts begin with disturbing 
encounters with objects such as a bookcase, a pencil, or a pebble and end with objects 
that may seem similar — a watering-can, a tin-lid, or a scratched record — but which 
reverse the crisis and afford a view of the kind of sublimity Flaubert may have 
had in mind. The banal objects that frighten Proust’s Marcel, Rilke’s Malte, 
Hofmannsthal’s Chandos, or Sartre’s Roquentin are not what J. P. Stern calls the 
‘emblems of plenty’ which, in texts, are indicative of ‘an unabating interest in this 
world and in this society as a thing real and, as to its reality, wholly unproblematic’ 
(Stern, 1973: 5, Stern’s italics): they stand out as alien to such an unproblematic 
equation between the material reality of the world and the virtual reality of a text. 
They are radically incapable of holding the kind of meaning that makes everyday 
things ‘die Gränzen der Menschen’ [the borders of people] (Nietzsche, 1971: 49), the 
tools that make pre-reflective action possible, the extensions of our unconscious will, 
obliging servants without lives of their own; but they are also not endowed with the 
kind of meaning things normally have in fiction — omens presaging plot or clues 
anchoring character or place. Their particular cumbersomeness poses a concrete 
problem in an abstract space.
This is achieved in part because, as I argued in The Banal Object, these texts place 
a romantic dilemma — the alienated individual trapped in an unfit emotional ecol-
ogy — inside a realist world of represented things. Realism grew out of romanticism 
but only in order to close the gap between self and world by accepting the rights of 
the ‘well-founded reality [that] holds madness up to ridicule’ (Auerbach, 1953: 347). 
These four texts offer a first-person perspective which is that of neither memoir 
nor confession; no one pretends to speak to anyone here, as they will in texts I 
shall discuss later. This is realism, like Miss Lonelyhearts, with its ‘back to the wall’ 
(see West, 1974: 78). Not only frustrated as people in a place, these narrators are 
frustrated as writers unable to write. 
Of course it all ends happily, though the reader is both witness to and ejected from 
the moment of solution. Marcel ends poised to start the book we are about to put 
down, Roquentin to adapt a diary into a novel that might, if he is lucky, cause read-
ers to think of his life as ‘quelque chose de précieux et d’à moitié légendaire’ (Sartre, 
1938: 249). But Chandos ends only able to hope that there might somehow be ‘eine 
Sprache, in welcher die stummen Dinge zu mir sprechen, und in welcher ich vielleicht 
einst im Grabe vor einem unbekannten Richter mich verantworten werde’ [a language 
in which mute objects speak to me and in which one day in my grave I may be able 
to give an account of myself before an unknown judge] (Hofmannsthal, 1955: 115). 
And, most interesting of all, Malte Laurids Brigge disappears completely from the 
text he has narrated and the Paris in which he has suffered; the book closes on a 
retelling of the story of the Prodigal Son in which the latter is the end-point of a 
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transitive sentence with no object: ‘er war jetzt furchtbar schwer zu lieben, und er 
fühlte, daß nur Einer dazu imstande sei. Der aber wollte noch nicht’ [he was now 
terribly difficult to love, and he felt that only One was now capable of that. But He 
was not yet willing] (Rilke, 1975: 234). 
The proof and the impossibility of solving the problem of materiality in fiction 
coexit, then, in each of these texts. This happens not only with the objects; it also 
happens with the bodies of the protagonists. The language they use to represent the 
crises is full of metaphors of penetration and absorption. These include images of 
eating and reproduction, the body ingesting, digesting, excreting, creating: Marcel, 
for example, finds a Combray that was once ‘comestible et dévote’ (Proust, 1954, i: 
383) now miraculously ‘sorti de ma tasse de thé’ (Proust, 1954, i: 48), and one of the 
things he then recollects is the first prose poem he wrote as a child and which made 
him feel exactly like ‘une poule [qui venait de] pondre un œuf’ (Proust, 1954, i: 
182).
This language of penetration and absorption may be horrible or gratifying, or even, 
most strikingly, both together. Thus, if he leaves open the window of his grim Paris 
room at night, Malte is bombarded with sensations: ‘Elektrische Bahnen rasen 
läutend durch meine Stube. Automobile gehen über mich hin’ [Electric trams race 
clamouring through my room. Cars rampage over me] (Rilke, 1975: 8); if Chandos 
tries to think straight, ‘die einzelnen Worte schwammen um mich: sie gerannen zu 
Augen, die mich anstarrten und in die ich wieder hineinstarren muß: Wirbel sind sie, 
in die hinabzusehen mich schwindelt, die sich unaufhaltsam drehen und durch die 
hindurch man ins Leere kommt’ [individual words swam around me; they congealed 
into eyes that stared at me, into which I had to stare back: they are whorls that trap 
you: you get dizzy looking down into them, they spin and spin and you tumble in, 
falling into endless emptiness] (Hofmannsthal, 1955: 109–10).
But almost identical horrors prove capable of producing a positive result. For 
instance, after Malte has fled from the exposed wall of a demolished house, realising 
to his horror that it is ‘zu Hause in mir’ [at home in me] (Rilke, 1975: 47), he reminds 
us of his grandfather’s house, described twenty pages earlier: 
So wie ich es in meiner kindlich gearbeiteten Erinnerung wiederfinde, ist es kein Gebäude: 
es ist ganz aufgeteilt in mir: da ein Raum, dort ein Raum und hier ein Stück Gang, das 
diese beide Räume nicht verbindet, sondern für sich, als Fragment, aufbewahrt ist. In 
dieser Weise ist alles in mir verstreut. [. . .] Es ist, als wäre das Bild dieses Hauses aus 
unendlicher Höhe in mich hineingestürzt und auf meinem Grunde zerschlagen. (Rilke, 
1975: 26–27)
[I search for it in my memory, reworked by the child I was, and find it is not a building 
at all but scattered in pieces inside me: here a room, there a room and here a bit of 
corridor which does not connect these two rooms but seems to be conserved by itself, like 
a fragment. In this way it is all dispersed inside me. [. . .] It is as though the image of this 
house had been flung from an infinite height and shattered into pieces on the floor of 
me.
Similarly, when in the Bouville public park, Roquentin finds a kind of relief
Elle était là, posée sur le jardin, dégringolée dans les arbres, toute molle, poissant tout, 
tout épaisse, une confiture. Et j’étais dedans, moi, avec tout le jardin? [. . .] Je n’étais pas 
surpris, je savais bien que c’était le Monde, le Monde tout nu qui se montrait tout d’un 
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coup, et j’étouffais de colère contre ce gros être absurde. [. . .] Je criai « quelle saleté, 
quelle saleté! » et je me secouai pour me débarrasser de cette saleté poisseuse, mais elle 
tenait bon et il y avait tant, des tonnes et des tonnes d’existence, indéfiniment: j’étouffais 
au fond de cet immense ennui. Et puis, tout d’un coup, le jardin se vida comme par un 
grand trou, le monde disparut de la même façon qu’il était venu, ou bien je me réveillai 
— en tout cas je ne le vis plus [. . .] 
Je me levai, je sortis. Arrivé à la grille, je me suis retourné. Alors le jardin m’a souri. 
(Sartre, 1938: 189–90)
In the first of these last two passages, Malte experiences memory like a sort of 
archaeological self-surgery, just as Marcel presents the recovery of the madeleine 
awaiting discovery in that tea-cup as treasure buried at the bottom of an internal sea: 
‘je sens tressaillir en moi quelque chose qui se déplace, voudrait s’élever, quelque 
chose qu’on aurait désancré, à une grande profondeur; je ne sais ce que c’est, mais 
cela monte lentement; j’éprouve la résistance et j’entends la rumeur des distances 
traversées’ (Proust, 1954, i: 46). Both construe the mind, the personal past, as a body-
world to be excavated. In the Sartre passage, the existentially charged present, in 
a quasi-hallucination, becomes something much more gendered: a bit of exorbitant 
nature in the city, a piece of femininity in Roquentin’s fantasy of himself: rather than 
explore the ‘ignoble marmelade’ (Sartre, 1938: 189) that is his inner landscape he lets 
himself in, and then out, of a mother-space. Emerging out of her, he sees her smile 
at him.
To summarize the main points of this first adventure in realism — if the problem 
of materiality in a verbal medium is posed in extremis in these four early twentieth-
century fictions, it also permits at least a provisional resolution. Objects close against 
and then open up to the quasi-autobiographical protagonist who, by narrating, can 
both enter and be entered by a textual world that is both edible and reproducible. 
How do readers play their essential part in making this happen?
Over the next twenty years, my research focused mainly on the question that 
is glimpsed in that last citation from Sartre: how does the feminine appear, often 
between the lines, of male-authored writing? This is another version of textual silenc-
ing that relies on a particular kind of reading to release it. I called my 1986 study of 
Manon Lescaut The Unintended Reader because I took it that the ‘enigma’ of such a 
figure as Manon, perceptible through the confession of the young man who has loved 
and lost her, can be understood only by a reading against the grain which unearths 
her from a text that exists to contain her. A few years later, in Narcissus and Echo, 
I performed the same operation on a series of texts that I call the ‘confessional récit’.2 
All in French, mainly from the early nineteenth century, these were short first-person 
fictions in which a man tells his tale to an older man from whom he seeks (and some-
times gets) a sort of absolution: the woman, whether loved too much or too little, 
whether culturally endogamous or exogamous, whether too virtuous or too wild, 
always dies, as his mother has generally died giving birth to him. What he does now 
is place his story, like a good Oedipus, in the hands of the father he no longer needs 
to kill, for the dead mother is here instead. I am still interested in the way that the 
narrator and the implied (intra- and extra-diegetic) narratees of such first-person 
fictions use text to inter the female figure while pretending to use it to disinter her.3 
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The relation of such drastic mourning to creativity, reproduction and replacement 
will be the subject of my next monograph, Eurydice’s Revenge; or, The Haunting of 
the Replacement Child.
These analyses would not have been possible without two theoretical assumptions: 
the feminist assumption that gender is everywhere, significant in both the wish to read 
and the wish to be read; and the psychoanalytic assumption that everything is an 
utterance and no utterance is innocent. I looked for the women in the male-authored, 
male-narrated récit and in the major novels that dominate third-person realism 
later in the nineteenth century. In The Adulteress’s Child (1992), the main texts were 
analysed in two groups: those of the ‘patrilinear mother’, where the beloved is the 
mother of one or more sons — Stendhal’s Le Rouge et le noir (1831), Flaubert’s 
L’Éducation sentimentale (1869), Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina (1873) and Maupassant’s 
Pierre et Jean (1887) — and those of the ‘matrilinear mother’, in which she is the 
mother of a daughter: Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1857), Hawthorne’s The Scarlet 
Letter (1850), Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895), and again Anna Karenina. Key topoi in 
these fictions are the sudden illness of the patrilinear mother’s son and the condemna-
tion of the matrilinear mother to a walled space (garden or cell) in which she suffers 
the incomprehensible fate of ‘only’ reproducing herself. When she dies, as she always 
does, of course, the bereaved child ends up fostered by her mother’s husband, whethe r 
her father or not. Thus the circle of legitimate paternity is closed and, concomitantly, 
the implied author’s position in these ‘mature’ texts is that of a paternal deity: in 
Flaubert’s terms again, he is like ‘Dieu dans l’univers: présent partout et visible nulle 
part’ (Flaubert, 1980: 204). 
For such a deity, or for Joyce’s similarly distanced author who ‘like the God of the 
creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, 
refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails’ (Joyce, 1977: 194–95), 
irony is the technique of first resort. Irony works by seducing the reader into siding 
with the implied author against the characters. It is particularly active in such tech-
niques as style indirect libre, in which the text continues in realism’s classic third 
person and (in French) past historic but we infer the voice of a ‘stupid character’ as 
presented without narratorial intervention by the ‘clever author’. My view is that it 
is our wish to side with cleverness over stupidity that makes us construe the ‘double 
voice’ at work (see Segal, 1990). Authors less intent on asserting their indifference 
may use the male protagonist — Julien Sorel, for example, permitted pleasure where, 
following an identical sick-son test, Frédéric Moreau is not — to act for them as a 
sort of phallic surrogate, seeking glory or love in their fictional worlds and sometimes 
getting lucky for the span of a fantasy. But the women remain baffling and mainly 
mute.
In my two most recent monographs, André Gide: Pederasty and Pedagogy (1998) 
and Consensuality: Didier Anzieu, Gender and the Sense of Touch (2009), the ques-
tion is less of women characters than of the feminine that haunts authorship and 
other forms of masculine creativity. Femininity may float disturbingly through Gide’s 
project of a pederastic-pedagogic reproduction without the lubrication of body fluids, 
or it may circulate dazzlingly around Diana’s skin or, less explicitly, that of Jude Law 
in Gattaca and The Talented Mr Ripley, but it is, characteristically, never in its 
place. 
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I want to finish by bringing these two motifs together. How do texts persuade 
readers to assent to their wiles? How, in particular, might they get us to piece out 
impossible bodies such as one that is neither male nor female, neither masculine nor 
feminine, neither heterosexual nor homosexual? In 2003 I contributed an essay on 
this topic to a collection called Indeterminate Bodies. Taking Sartre’s reading of 
Raskolnikov as my starting-point, I looked at texts by Rose Macaulay, Proust, and 
Gide.
What happens when we try to construe Laurie, the first-person protagonist of Rose 
Macaulay’s The Towers of Trebizond (1956), who is neither a man nor a woman? 
When we read: ‘He told me that the Imam was saying that I must hold no services 
in Trabzon, or he would call the police. I said I would hold no services, since I was 
not, as he could see, a priest’ (Macaulay, 1981: 115) or ‘[there] was Vere standing at 
the reception desk and giving a note to the reception clerk, and so we met, and then 
nothing else seemed to matter’ (Macaulay, 1981: 148), it may not matter to Laurie 
but it certainly matters to us. If we cannot ‘see’ the person who could not be a priest 
or who is in love with cousin Vere — who we learn posthumously at the very end of 
the text had a wife — then in an important way we are invited into the fiction only 
to be refused the wherewithal to live there. How we deal with this is, I believe, 
dependent on how we deal not only with the sex of a fictional body but with 
fictional gender (the much-disputed ‘female sentence’?) or fictional sexuality (we 
now know Vere was a man but that does not help us know the body that desires 
him). Of course, this is because Macaulay wants to create texts that are not simply 
androgynous but indeterminate.
Proust’s narrator Marcel is attracted by a ‘petite bande’ of girls on a beach who all 
his readers know are based on adolescent boys. Later he is obsessed with his lover 
Albertine, keeping her virtually incarcerated, having her followed, whenever she goes 
out, to discover whether she is a lesbian. Gide objected to this gender transposition 
as having converted ‘« à l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs » tout ce que ses souvenirs 
homosexuels lui proposaient de gracieux, de tendre et de charmant, de sorte qu’il ne 
lui reste plus pour Sodome que du grotesque et de l’abject’ (Gide, 1996: 1126). But 
how do we read both Albertine’s body and that of jealous Marcel? 
If, knowing that Proust never desired women and with the minimal biographical 
information to pin down the grand amour in the figure of his married chauffeur-
secretary Alfred Agostinelli, we try to understand the dynamics of this transposition, 
we find something more complex than Gide and perhaps Proust himself seem to have 
suspected. When the biographical structure homosexual man desires bisexual man 
who desires women is transposed in fiction into heterosexual man desires bisexual 
woman who desires women, an equivalent logic of frustration is turned into a differ-
ent logic of identification. If Marcel cannot epistemologically enter into Albertine’s 
desire, and is thus eternally tormented by it, it is because he cannot imagine himself 
in that scene as her object, just as Proust does not figure as object in Agostinelli’s 
desire for his wife. But the epistemological screw is turned a point further. Proust, a 
man, has a body like Agostinelli’s to desire with, and so shares his subject position. 
Marcel desires the same sex that Albertine does but not, he declares, in the same way. 
What fantasy scenario has Proust created as author? Excluded as possible object, he 
is forced inside as the subject whose soul wants what its body is not and whose soul 
is what its body cannot want — a version of the inversion theory that he invokes in 
the case of ‘grotesque, abject’ Charlus.4
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The third example comes, despite his disapproval, from the pen of Gide. When 
he created the character of Gertrude out of his love for Marc Allégret, he was not 
consciously making the gender-transposition he abhorred in Proust. What he was 
doing was a more radical transposition of sexuality, dealing in fiction with the break-
down of a principle he had formulated in his early twenties whereby love belonged 
to his cousin Madeleine, with whom he shared an over-forty-year unconsummated 
marriage, and desire belonged to a series of young boys, mostly black or working-
class. The passion for Marc, which was mainly played out during a 1918 trip to 
Cambridge, caused a major crisis between André and Madeleine and, in terms of his 
creative work, formed a break in the writing of two two-part texts, his coming-out 
memoir Si le Grain ne meurt (1924) and the diary récit La Symphonie pastorale (1919). 
In the latter, an unnamed pastor tells how he rescues, educates, and falls in love with 
a blind girl whom his family call Gertrude; when she recovers her sight, she realizes 
it was his son she loved all along (this son has meanwhile decided to become a 
Catholic priest), and then commits suicide. As in all Gide’s récits, the first person is 
used ironically; the irony is directed at the pastor’s spiritual blindness, unadmitted 
sensuality, confusion between different meanings of the word ‘love’ and the Protes-
tant religion’s susceptibility to such misreadings. But of course, familiarly, by serving 
up the narrator-lover to the critique of the reader, the irony leaves the author safely 
out of sight and unimplicated, parthenogenetically paring his fingernails.
Indeed, the plot and characters of La Symphonie pastorale endorse this. They, too, 
live and die by a dream of parthenogenesis. Long before the pastor has ‘sinned’ by 
his amorous interest in his pupil he has already used her to imagine creating a child 
without the mediation of a woman, and a world to keep that child in which there is 
no taint of flawed material reality. It is when Gertrude becomes able to see the ‘real’ 
world that she chooses to die rather than live in its embrace, and at the same moment 
Jacques enters a monastery in reaction against the impossibility of reifying the idea 
of fatherhood in his body; through celibacy he will become a ‘spiritual father’ instead. 
Each one of these characters is trying to produce an immaterial universe conceived 
on the model of fiction. They are banned from the everyday world which in Gide is 
always the ‘hateful’ universe of family life. As they perish, legitimate authorship lives 
— by the very same fantasy.
If, then, Macaulay conjures up an experience of androgynous desire by an 
androgynous protagonist creating an androgynous reading, and Proust forces the 
reader to follow through the logic of perversely imagining the gender spirals of jeal-
ousy, the pleasure of the act of authorship for Gide is represented in a centrifugal 
gesture by which he makes himself (like Flaubert, though with the opposite concept) 
into that God-like thing, a subject of no sex, no gender, and above all no desire.
In sum, where does the body of realism reside? The material of a text — objects, 
characters — is mute without the bodied assent of a reader. In a first-person text the 
entry-point may be the imagined person of the narrator — situated, like our bodies, 
in a sex, a gender, or a mode of desire. Or it may be that of the implied author whose 
fantasy of divine control has caused the fictional world to be and who choreographs 
the play of ironies from on high. Either way, the ‘literary object has no other 
substance than the subjectivity of the reader’ and the latter’s pleasure in sharing it 
around.
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Notes
All translations from German are my own, and 
reference is to the original text.
1 The four texts focused on in my thesis (Banal 
Objects) were: Hofmannsthal’s ‘Ein Brief’ (1902), 
Rilke’s Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids 
Brigge (1910), Proust’s A la Recherche du temps 
perdu (1913–27), and Sartre’s La Nausée (1938). 
2 The main texts covered in this book are Prévost’s 
Manon Lescaut (1731; 1753), Mérimée’s Carmen 
(1845), Chateaubriand’s Atala (1801) and René 
(1802), Constant’s Adolphe (1816), Gautier’s 
Mademoiselle de Maupin (1835–36), Musset’s La 
Confession d’un enfant du siècle (1836), Nerval’s 
‘Sylvie’ (1853) and Fromentin’s Dominique (1863), 
and Gide’s L’Immoraliste (1902) and La Porte étroite 
(1909).
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